In Defense Of Bitcoin Full Reserve: Not Anti-Credit, But Anti-Fiduciary Media

This article from July 28th, 2022 by Stephan Livera was originally published on Bitcoin Magazine.

The debate rages on about the proper roles of Bitcoin, “crypto, ” and lending. What kind of credit should we have, if any? What is fiduciary media, and do we need it? Or should it all be fully reserved?

In this article, I will spell out some thoughts on this long-running debate and how it applies in the context of Bitcoin.

For the impatient, the short answer is: We don’t need fractional-reserved fiduciary media for credit and commerce to exist in society. You can have commodity credit in a full-reserve banking system; it merely stops the circulation of credit and the creation of fiduciary media. The defense of “free” fractional-reserve banking amounts to a kind of special pleading, inflationist stance. This does not preclude the fact that many will try to commit fractional-reserve banking fraud, but “the market” does not necessarily have to serve this demand, nor is it beneficial to society.

Those who take the Rothbardian full-reserve view are generally arguing that:

1. Fractional-reserve banking is fraud.

2. Fractional-reserve banking causes financial instability, this being due to malinvestment driving what’s known as the Austrian business cycle theory.

Now, some in the full reserve camp will downplay or skip over the first point around fraud, as they believe that even if we disregard the fraud argument, there are still negative economic consequences in a society that tolerates fractional reserve banking.

Austrian economists in the full-reserve camp include Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, Jesús Huerta de Soto, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Joseph T. Salerno, Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Philipp Bagus, David Howden and Robert P. Murphy. This camp would generally believe that banks' reserve ratios should and/or would remain at or near 100%.

Those who take the “free banking” view generally argue that “free market, fractional-reserve” banking regimes can be laissez-faire and work in a stable way. They believe bank reserve ratios could sustainably operate in the 2% to 5% range. There may be some bank failures, but “free bankers” may put this down to bad government regulation. Well-known economists and proponents here include Larry White and George Selgin.

As Mises spells out in "Human Action,” commodity credit is the kind permissible under a full-reserve system. It means banks are lending out their own funds or the funds entrusted to the banks by customers.

Imagine momentarily that a bank had 100 gold ounces in its vault. And it issues out paper tickets, each representing one gold ounce, for the community to trade around in place of carrying around the gold (verifying and measuring it, etc). So long as the bank only issues up to 100 paper tickets, there is no fiduciary media. One customer could come and deposit five tickets with the understanding that they are relinquishing control for a given period. The bank could loan those five tickets out to another customer, which would be consistent with commodity credit.

Now, imagine that the bank issued out 150 paper tickets (each purporting to represent an ounce of gold), but it only had 100 gold ounces in the vault. In this situation, we have a creation of fiduciary media. Those additional 50 tickets (above and beyond the genuine 100) represent claims to gold ounces that literally do not exist.

Banks creating loans and credit by issuing fiduciary media are granting circulation credit. This is what the Misesian and Rothbardian Bitcoiners are objecting to. We generally argue that a fractional reserve banking system is only sustainable with government intervention, typically a central bank lender of last resort, or with government-granted permission for banks to not grant in-specie redemption (i.e., not letting customers withdraw their coins).

In a sense, this debate has raged for hundreds of years and even predates the Austrian school of economics. This debate has gone on between the currency school and the banking school. The currency school was some of the OG hard money men who wanted a full-reserve banking system. They even managed to put in the Bank Charter Act (aka, Peel Act) in the U.K. in 1844, which did mandate 100% reserves for banknote issuance; however, as they did not also mandate 100% reserves on bank demand deposits, the system of fractional-reserve banking still survived. The Peel Act was later suspended.

In terms of the full-reserve Austrians and the “free bankers,” most of this debate took place in the 1990s, but there have been occasional volleys back and forth even in recent years. Notably, George Selgin and Murphy debated this topic in 2018. Stephan Kinsella has a reading list post here for those interested. Also of interest will be this Kristoffer Hansen post at Mises.org, "Understanding The Rothbardian Critique Of Free Banking.” I can’t hope to cover every possible aspect of this debate in one post, but I will attempt to summarize and respond to key points.

Recently, Nic Carter has asserted that this recent “crypto” credit crunch is not the end of crypto lending. He is defending credit and the “free banker” position with some historical parallels to what happened recently with lenders such as Celsius.

Carter mentions:

“Today, Bitcoiners are gleeful about the collapse of credit in the crypto industry.”

More like Bitcoiners were cautioning against high-risk platforms and encouraging self-custody. Sometimes, people have to point to recent examples to teach their lesson, just like how, after the fall of Mt. Gox or QuadrigaCX, it became much easier to sell the message of self-custody.

Carter comments:

“They often follow a Rothbardian ideal, believing fractional reserve banking to be ‘fraud,’ even though the idealized ‘full reserve banking’ generally never emerges in free market conditions.”

So, as mentioned above, yes, I do believe fractional-reserve banking is a fraud, but no, I disagree with what Carter is implying here. Fractional reserve banking has had the backing of the State. Therefore, this outcome we’re living in today resulted from political entrepreneurship rather than genuine free market entrepreneurship.

When the government puts in central bankers, lenders of last resort, and provides special privileges to bankers, e.g., allowing them to deny in-specie redemption to customers and deposit insurance, this gives an artificial privilege that would not exist under a genuinely free market. Hülsmann has written a paper on this idea titled “Has Fractional-Reserve Banking Really Passed The Market Test?" For example, see this section by Hülsmann:

“The banker turned fraud who issues the first uncovered money title is, in fact, a ‘political entrepreneur.’ He ‘tests the market’ to discover how far he can go in violating property rights without encountering resistance.”

See also this interesting section by Hülsmann:

“A large number of fractional-reserve banks, to say the least, have used such words intentionally in two mutually exclusive senses, and this usage has concealed underlying real differences. These banks’ customers were led to believe that they had bought a financial product of type A, but in legal settlements, they were told that they actually had bought a product of type B.”

Doesn’t this sound familiar with what’s happening to Celsius customers? See this analysis from a business restructuring lawyer, for instance:

“Celsius has set the stage for conflict between its customers and its sophisticated institutional creditors — in particular, Celsius has pointed out in its pleadings that customers transferred ownership of crypto assets to Celsius, making those customers unsecured creditors. This detail may undercut customer expectations, who thought they were depositing their assets into a construct similar to a traditional bank.”

And see this video clip compilation of Celsius Network videos where CEO Alex Mashinsky is asserting that “Celsius is a safe place to store your coins” and that “a run on a bank cannot happen at Celsius because Celsius never lends more than what it has.”

For clarity here, Celsius may not have been running a fractional reserve banking operation. Instead, it may have been a poorly run financial intermediary, which possibly degenerated into a Ponzi scheme (at least that’s what is being alleged in this court case). Business and bank failures are a fact of life, whether we live in a full-reserve or fractional-reserve banking world.

Carter claims:

“During Scottish ‘free banking, ’ a fully laissez-faire, markets-based system, reserve ratios were commonly 2-5%, and the system worked swimmingly.”

Not so fast! There were entire stretches of time where some of these so-called “free market” free bankers were permitted to not redeem in specie (i.e., they could freeze customer withdrawals) while, at the same time, still enforcing payment obligations on other people. Isn’t this curious? How can the “free bankers” herald Scottish free banking when customer redemptions were not permitted for a period of over 20 years?

For evidence, see Rothbard’s writing in “The Myth Of Free Banking in Scotland,” his response to White:

“From the beginning, there is one embarrassing and evident fact that Professor White has to cope with: that ‘free’ Scottish banks suspended specie payment when England did, in 1797, and, like England, maintained that suspension until 1821. Free banks are not supposed to be able to, or want to, suspend specie payment, thereby violating the property rights of their depositors and noteholders, while they themselves are permitted to continue in business and force payment upon their debtors.” 

Later, Carter is talking about credit in general:

“A world with no credit is a dismal one. Credit — responsibly extended — is the cornerstone of civilization. It unleashes savings and puts the money to work in productive areas of the economy. A world without credit is a sterile, stagnant one.”

So, as discussed above, the critical distinction to understand here is commodity credit (OK) versus circulation credit (fraudulent and causing economic instability). Once we make this distinction, it is all much clearer.

To spell this out: From a Rothbardian Bitcoiner point of view, in principle, there could be a Bitcoin bank that takes in Bitcoin and loans out commodity credit loans denominated in Bitcoin — and there’d be no issue as there is no fiduciary media created. It’s just that today, such a proposition would be extremely high risk as very few entrepreneurs and businesses have successfully ROI’ed in Bitcoin terms over longer periods. In this sense, there would be very few customers, and very few lenders willing to take this kind of risk for appreciable Bitcoin sums over an appreciable period. In practice, this kind of thing might more realistically occur post-hyperbitcoinization or closer to it.

Carrying on with Carter’s article, Carter quotes from my recent article on Bitcoin Maximalism, speaking of how most Maximalists are simply not interested in non-monetary uses and commenting on the recent failures of lenders in the space. I commented that there’s a case to say that the Maximalists who encouraged self-custody and not putting Bitcoin on high-risk platforms were right.

Here’s Carter:

“But were they? If their victory condition is 'no credit is ever extended based on a crypto asset ever again, ' they guarantee a loss.”

So, as mentioned above, the distinction to keep in mind is commodity credit versus circulation credit. I believe that commodity credit could theoretically work under a Bitcoin standard with full-reserve banking. Therefore, my point is “no credit ever,” Carter’s statement here is overly reductive.

Also while we’re here, it’s worthwhile pointing out that this specific debate about “free banking” fractional reserve versus full reserve isn’t really a question of Maximalism per se. It’s an orthogonal debate as a person could conceivably be a “free banker” and Maximalist, or they could be in favor of full reserve and Maximalist.

Carter continues:

“The desire for leverage and a lower cost of capital on one hand, and yield on the other, is inherent to free, capitalist enterprise, and that urge will never disappear.”

Of course, people want leverage. The question is, can it be ethically and sustainably provided? And would it be beneficial to society? Under a fractional-reserve banking system with fiduciary media, sure, it can be provided — the challenge and question is more about whether such a thing is ethical or desirable for the overall economy. I say no, it’s not. It does not enrich society on the whole, it merely enriches those getting the newly-printed tokens first and bankers servicing those interests.

Here’s Carter:

“But were they? If their victory condition is 'no credit is ever extended based on a crypto asset ever again, ' they guarantee a loss.”

So, as mentioned above, the distinction to keep in mind is commodity credit versus circulation credit. I believe that commodity credit could theoretically work under a Bitcoin standard with full-reserve banking. Therefore, my point is “no credit ever,” Carter’s statement here is overly reductive.

Also while we’re here, it’s worthwhile pointing out that this specific debate about “free banking” fractional reserve versus full reserve isn’t really a question of Maximalism per se. It’s an orthogonal debate as a person could conceivably be a “free banker” and Maximalist, or they could be in favor of full reserve and Maximalist.

Carter continues:

“The desire for leverage and a lower cost of capital on one hand, and yield on the other, is inherent to free, capitalist enterprise, and that urge will never disappear.”

Of course, people want leverage. The question is, can it be ethically and sustainably provided? And would it be beneficial to society? Under a fractional-reserve banking system with fiduciary media, sure, it can be provided — the challenge and question is more about whether such a thing is ethical or desirable for the overall economy. I say no, it’s not. It does not enrich society on the whole; it merely enriches those getting the newly-printed tokens first and bankers servicing those interests.

From my perspective, people will need to learn the difference between Bitcoin, for which they hold the private keys, and mere Bitcoin IOUs. If people blur the line here, or perhaps even equivocate the different IOUs of different providers (say a Celsius Bitcoin IOU with a Voyager Bitcoin IOU), this more easily opens the door to widespread fractionally-reserved coins that effectively go above the 21 million cap.

Of course, this risk may not be systemic; it would be localized to those individuals who are overly trusting of other peoples’ IOUs. Nevertheless, it’s worthwhile for Bitcoin HODLers and users to understand this crucial difference.

Not necessarily. As my friend Pierre Rochard wrote eight years ago in his prescient article, “Speculative Attack,” we may well see individuals leverage up using the fiat system. In this way, they are using the fiat system against itself to stack more sats and perhaps help advance the process of hyperbitcoinization. Now, of course, this carries risks and costs, but for specific individuals or entities who can access cheap credit, such as MicroStrategy, it might well be reasonable.

I believe both sides of the “free banking” versus full reserve debate would welcome the development, commercialization, and widespread use of proof-of-reserves techniques. Credit to Carter for being a vocal proponent of proof-of-reserves technology. This has been implemented in various places in the Bitcoin and “crypto” world, such as at Kraken, Ledn, and at previous Bitcoin exchange Coinfloor U.K. (since purchased by Coincorner).

The disagreement, in this case, would be on what the reserve ratio should be, as “free bankers” may conceivably be fine with a reserve ratio of 2%. In comparison, full-reserve Bitcoiners want a 100% reserve ratio.

Full-reserve Bitcoiners also appreciate the explicit no-rehypothecation approach of lenders such as Unchained Capital. Because Unchained loans use Bitcoin multi-signature technology, the coins may not be rehypothecated as all three key holders (borrower, unchained, and third-party key agent) can confirm exactly what’s happening to the Bitcoin on-chain.

The fiat USD being loaned out for these loans is obviously still a part of the broader USD fractional-reserve banking system.

Now, you could believe that, in practice, there won’t be much or any commodity credit extended over the longer term. Saifedean Ammous argues a similar point in his book “The Fiat Standard: and discussed this with me on “SLP296.”

Without fractional-reserve lending subsidized by cheap debt, investors may reach a saturation point sooner with their capital. If time preference and interest rates are genuinely very low, investors may not want to take the risk of loaning out Bitcoin via a debt instrument, given that the interest rate offered is very low. Investors may very much prefer to give some bitcoin in exchange for an equity share in a business.

So, on this basis, there may legitimately be an argument that very little commodity credit would be extended anyway. We’d see far less debt issued and more equity investment in this world.

If you believe in the Bitcoin saying, “Not your keys, not your coins, ” then you too are in favor of full-reserve Bitcoin. The view implied by those who want to permit “free” fractional-reserve banking is one where there are multiple claimants to the same coins or the same resources of society. This difference cannot be squared in my view.

It’s also important to understand that there are legitimate arguments as to how and why we ended up in a fractional reserve system that did not result from a free market. Of course, bankers always try to do this because it allows them to profit massively! The “free-banking” movement is a special pleading on behalf of inflationary commercial banks.

Society would not be less vibrant in a world without fractional reserve banking. If anything, the society we live in today is more sterile and stagnant because of the artificial boom and bust conditions that capitalist investors and entrepreneurs have to deal with. Moving to a Bitcoin full reserve system could, in practice, make society far more prosperous with continued sustainable growth rather than “lumpy” artificial booms followed by busts.

Thanks to my friend Pierre Rochard for his feedback on this article.